



REMARKS
OF
WILMOT G. DESAUSSURE, PRESIDENT,

TO

THE STATE SOCIETY OF THE CINCINNATI OF SOUTH CAROLINA,

ON

20TH OCTOBER, 1884.

Gentlemen of the Cincinnati Society: Permit me, in rising to propose the regular toast at this meeting, to preface it with some remarks which I hope may interest you:

Stedman, in his History of the American War, says, v. 2, p. 187, "The Commander-in-Chief (Sir Henry Clinton) in his public order issued after the surrender of the town, and in his dispatches to the Secretary of State, was lavish in his encomiums upon the officers who served under him, and the troops he commanded. The assistance he received during the siege from his general officers, Earl Cornwallis, Major-Generals Leslie, Huyne, and Kospolt, and Brigadier-General Patterson, is not only honorably remembered but thankfully acknowledged." Very little could Earl Cornwallis and his associates, when thus triumphing at the capitulation of Charles Town, So. Ca., on 12th May, 1780, have anticipated that the apparent success which had then attended their arms, was in fact but an initiative step to the surrender at Yorktown, by the same Earl Cornwallis, on 19th October, 1781. The capitulation of Charles Town had seemed to the British Government, and its military com-

manders in America, the blow which would at last reduce the rebellious colonies to submission. The Southern Colonies were now subdued, as they thought, and it only remained for the British armies in the Southern Colonies, and from New York, to envelop the army under General Washington, crush his forces out, and then quietly reduce the New England Colonies. British hopes and anticipations for such a result ran very high, and for a time seemed about to be realized. Had any one had the temerity to whisper that the fair promise was not only illusory, but actually a step on the road to defeat, he would have been regarded as a fanatic and madman. Yet such was in fact the case, as we know by the light of after events.

When the war of the Revolution commenced at Lexington, on 19th April, 1775, the British army may be said to have been massed in Boston, Massachusetts. Referring to the troops then in Boston, Stedman says: "An addition to the land and sea forces was voted by the House of Commons, and a large reinforcement ordered to Boston, under the command of the Generals Howe, Clinton and Burgoyne, all of them officers of reputation." The battle of Bunker's Hill, on 16th June, 1775, the action of the Continental Congress in raising troops, and the siege of Boston, all gave assurance to the British Government that a war had actually been inaugurated.

The same author says: "All the colonies, now united, vied with each other in professions of invincible attachment to the common cause; and the Congress beheld their power acknowledged, in a very great degree, from Nova Scotia to Georgia. And it was now evident that the mother country was as resolutely determined to maintain, as they were to resist her authority. They began to concert measures for supporting a war, and, in the first place, to consider where that authority was most vulnerable. With these sentiments they cast their eyes on the Province of Canada."

The expedition to that Province, though sanctified by the patriotic bood of Montgomery, and the many gallant men who, under his command, laid down their lives in the

righteous cause in which they had taken up arms, proved not only unsuccessful but disastrous. Had the British commanders in America, in their subsequent successes, pursued the same humane, gallant, and wise course adopted by Sir Guy Carleton towards the unfortunate prisoners taken then, a different result may have fallen to the American struggle. A Latin author said: "*Quos Deus vult perdere, prius dementat.*" As we proceed we may see how signally this was illustrated.

While the Canadian expedition was progressing, the siege of Boston by the American troops was steadily continued, and "the British troops blockaded in Boston suffered incredible hardships and fatigue." * * * It was therefore determined to evacuate the town. * * It was effected, and the brave garrison, with those attached to the British cause, in number about 2000, embarked for Halifax, in Nova Scotia. * * Thus was the capital of Massachusetts added to the American cause." (Stedman.)

The colonies were, by this evacuation, relieved of the presence of the British. But in the mean time, the British Government was endeavoring, among the Highlander settlements of North Carolina, to embody troops with a view to the preservation and restoration of Royal authority in that Province. Governor Martin (the Royal Governor) held out such representations that "in consequence of these representations, the Fifteenth, Twenty-eighth, Thirty-third, Thirty-seventh, Fifty-fourth, and Fifty-seventh Regiments, with seven companies of the Forty-sixth Regiment, embarked from Cork, on 12th February, 1776, under the command of Lord Cornwallis, in several transports, under the convoy of Sir Peter Parker." (Stedman.) On 3d May, 1776, these arrived in the Cape Fear River, and General Clinton took command. "General Clinton's orders were to try if any of the Southern Provinces would take up arms in favor of Britain; in which case he was to have left a body of troops to assist these loyalists; but he was instructed to repair with the remainder of the troops to New York harbor by such time as it was possible that the commander-

in-chief would arrive from Halifax, to begin the great operations for that campaign." (Stedman.) General Clinton, pursuing the general purpose of his instructions, on 28th June, 1776, engaged Fort Moultrie, and was driven out of Charleston harbor, and from the Southern States. "On 21st (July) the army sailed for New York, under the convoy of the Solebay frigate, the rest of the fleet being under the necessity of remaining to refit. Thus ended an expedition from which the friends of government had predicted the most beneficial consequences." (Stedman.)

On 29th June, 1776, the British army, which, with "the reinforcements brought from England, amounted, with the troops already in America, to near 30,000 men," began to rendezvous at Sandy Hook. To oppose this force, which was again reinforced shortly after, General Washington had less than 9,000 troops of all descriptions, very many of whom were unarmed: and at no time during the operations around New York did his army exceed 16,000. It is not wonderful then, that, outnumbered by two to one, and the outnumbering army supplied with the best arms and appliances then known in warfare, and with the army aided by a powerful fleet co-operating on a water field admirably fitted for its use, that the Continental army was obliged to evacuate New York, and place itself in position along the Hudson river. The British plan of the campaign of the years 1776 and 1777 seems to have been to operate by the Hudson, so as to separate the New England Provinces from the Middle and Southern, doubtless with the intent to turn either to the right or left, as circumstances should develop, and so destroy the American army in detail. It is accordingly found that the rest of 1776 was given to such plan, and to threats through New Jersey, upon Philadelphia, where the Continental Congress held its sessions. The year 1777 found this plan being still carried out, while Burgoyne was marching from Canada towards New York. Lord Howe was endeavoring to penetrate up the Hudson, so as to make a junction with him, the effect of which would have been just what seems to have been the strategic design,

when New York was selected as the salient point from which to attack and destroy the American army.

The expeditions up the Hudson came to naught, and at Saratoga, on 17th October, 1777, the army under Burgoyne was surrendered as prisoners of war. So that this plan of campaign, through the vigilance and skill of the American commander, and the devotion, gallantry, and courage of the troops under his command, failed of its accomplishment. But as an auxiliary to the plan of campaign, Sir William Howe, in July, 1777, operated, with a large force, by the way of the Chesapeake Bay, against Philadelphia, and on 27th September, 1777, occupied that city, the American army being too weak and ill provided to prevent it. Had the expedition up the Hudson and Burgoyne's march from Canada been successful, the two combined with the capture of Philadelphia, may have put an end to the war. But the failures of the two first paralyzed the last, and Sir Wm. Howe sat down in Philadelphia from September, 1777, to June, 1778, having accomplished very comparatively little towards the great operations of the campaign. So little, that even when, at Valley Forge, in winter quarters, the army of General Washington was reduced to about 3000 men, nearly naked, almost starved, and very ill armed, the British army accomplished nothing against it. It is true that in December, 1777, an expedition, which was intended to surprise and capture or destroy the American army, was organized, and may possibly have been successful but for the heroic conduct of that noble Quakeress, Lydia Darrell, whose name and whose act of devotion should be embalmed in and dear to every American heart.

In June, 1778, Philadelphia was evacuated, and the plains of New Jersey became the battle fields of the war. But it had by this time become apparent to the British commander that a new plan of campaign must be organized. First, however, in a spirit of revenge for disappointed expectations in the early autumn of 1778, Rhode Island was ravaged with ruthless barbarity.

The new campaign turned to the Southern Provinces for

its field. St. Augustine, Florida, was the gathering place of the tories from the Southern Colonies, and the Indians along the borders of the Southern Colonies had been inflamed by British emissaries and arts, until it was thought the time was ripe to inaugurate a campaign which should subjugate the Southern Provinces, and take them from the American Union. In December, 1778, this campaign was inaugurated, and Savannah was captured. Apprehending something of this, the commander of the Southern Department, General Robert Howe, had planned, in the summer of 1778, an expedition against Florida, which had signally failed, and proved disastrous in the extreme from the mortality which ensued upon a summer campaign in the swamps and morasses of lower Georgia and Florida. Of the continental troops which took part in this campaign, nearly two-thirds died, and like losses were sustained by the State troops and militia.

In May, 1779, the British General, Prevost, seeing the great part of the American army, which lay between Savannah and Charleston, carried off on a bootless expedition to Augusta, Georgia, made a bold dash for Charleston, and had nearly succeeded in capturing it. The rapid concentration of the returning American troops, with the reinforcement of militia, and the consciousness that he himself was scarcely prepared to stand a siege, even if he captured Charleston, caused Prevost to decamp in hot haste, and by the way of the Sea Islands route, return to Savannah. His expedition, however, developed the fact that Charleston could be assailed by land, and it left a garrison at Beaufort, So. Ca., as a starting point. True this garrison was withdrawn in October, 1779, to reinforce the garrison at Savannah, when assaulted by the combined French and American forces. But the skill displayed by the British commander, Colonel Maitland, in carrying this garrison to Savannah, disclosed the fact that a judicious use of these internal water ways would be of immense advantage in such subsequent operations as should be inaugurated.

During the year 1779, the operations of the British army

in the Northern Colonies had been, generally, of a desultory character. Apparently, judging by after events, the campaign plans of 1780-1781 were being slowly organized, and the means being gathered to ensure their success. While these things had been going on, Sir William Howe had retired from the command of the British army, and been succeeded by Sir Henry Clinton.

This brief sketch has been given to show what had, seemingly, been the British plans of campaign up to the opening of 1780, and why those plans having proved unsuccessful, a new plan, from which more could be hoped, was to be substituted.

Stedman details the plan, and commences thus: "Sir Henry Clinton having been cramped in his operations by the proceedings of the French fleet under Count d'Estaing, whose unsuccessful attack upon Savannah, together with his final departure from the American coast, has already been related, no sooner received certain information of the departure of d'Estaing than he set on foot an expedition, the object of which was the taking of Charleston, and the reduction of the Province of South Carolina." Tarleton, in his Memoirs, reiterates this.

The result of this campaign was "the capitulation was signed on the 12th May (1780), and on the same day the garrison laid down their arms, and Major-General Leslie took possession of the town. By the articles of capitulation the garrison were allowed some of the honors of war, they were to march out and deposit their arms between the canal and the works of the place; but the drums were not to beat a British march, nor the colors to be uncased; the Continental troops and seamen, keeping their baggage, were to remain prisoners of war until exchanged; the militia were to be permitted to return to their respective homes as prisoners on parole, and while they kept their parole, were not to be molested in their property by the British troops; the citizens of all descriptions were to be considered as prisoners on parole, and to hold their property in the town on the same terms as the militia."

"By the fall of Charleston, the capture of the Deputy Governor, and the greatest part of the Council, and the defeat and dispersion of the only regular force which Gen'l Lincoln had left without the lines, the war in South Carolina seemed entirely subdued: and these expeditions, set on foot by the Commander in Chief, immediately after these events, appeared well calculated to deepen the impression that had been made, and to extinguish every idea of further resistance amongst the people of the interior country, if any such idea could at that time be supposed to exist."

These expeditions were designed to spread over the Province, establish garrisoned posts in various different localities, and by force of arms subjugate the State.

Sir Henry Clinton also issued three proclamations: the first called upon those who sympathised with the British cause, to embody themselves into troops, the older men to act as a home militia, and the younger men to enter into active service: the second promised "protection and support to the King's faithful and peaceable subjects, and the most exemplary severity, with confiscation of property, denounced against those who should hereafter appear in arms within the Province against his majesty's government, or who should attempt to compel any others to do so, or who should hinder or intimidate any of the King's faithful and loving subjects from joining his forces, or performing those duties which their allegiance required: the third, issued as "commissioner for restoring peace to the colonies," offered full and free pardon to all who having been misled from duty should immediately return to their allegiance, and a due obedience to the laws."

Lord Cornwallis was in command of the main expedition, that which marched upon Camden; and Lieutenant-Colonel Tarleton, detached from his command, was sent in pursuit of Colonel Buford. The butchery which ensued is too well known to need repetition. Even Stedman says: "but the virtue of humanity was totally forgot." And he also says "upon the march to Camden the British troops were supported from the country through which they passed.

A number of negroes mounted on horses were employed, under proper conductors, in driving in cattle for the support of the army, and though they were in general very small, the army was plentifully supplied." From this it will be seen that the policy adopted was ruthless, notwithstanding the articles of capitulation so recently signed. No quarter to men in arms, even although not prisoners on parole; no protection to property although solemnly guaranteed. Stedman continues: "The last remains of the Continental force in South Carolina being extirpated by the defeat of Buford at Waxhaws, and the inhabitants in most parts of the Province having either submitted to the British Government, or taken paroles from the officers commanding the detachments sent among them, the commander-in-chief, considering the Province as completely reduced, thought fit, previous to his departure for New York, to alter the condition of those who had submitted upon parole; and instead of considering them any longer as prisoners, to require of them the duties, and entitle them to the rights of active citizens and loyal subjects. For this purpose a proclamation was issued, bearing date 3d June, declaring that all the inhabitants of the Province who were prisoners on parole, except those who were in the military line, and those who were in Fort Moultrie, or in Charleston at the time of the surrender of those places, or who were then in actual confinement, should, from and after the 20th of that month, be freed and exempted from all such paroles, and be restored to the rights and duties of citizens and inhabitants. But by the same proclamation it was also declared that all persons under the above description, who should afterwards neglect to return to their allegiance, and a due submission to his majesty's government, should be considered as enemies and rebels to the same, and be treated accordingly. These general regulations having been established, the commander-in-chief, on 5th June, embarked for New York, carrying with him all the troops that could be spared, leaving Lieutenant-General Earl Cornwallis in the command of those that remained, with the charge of prosecuting the

war in South Carolina as soon as the season of the year and other circumstances would permit." Lossing says of this, "this flagrant violation of the terms of capitulation aroused a spirit of indignant defiance which proved a powerful lever in overturning the royal power in the South." Speaking of this course as one of the causes which subsequently led to the general uprising against the British authority, Stedman says: "These classes of men were very early disgusted by the proclamation of Sir Henry Clinton, which, without their consent, abrogated the paroles that had been granted, and in one instant converted them either into loyal subjects or rebels. If it was proper policy at first to hold a middle course between these opposite extremes, the same policy required that it should have been continued some time longer; and that the conditions of the inhabitants should have been altered rather at their own application, either individually or collectively, than by the arbitrary *fiat* of the commander-in-chief."

Two steps in the mad career had been taken; this was the third; a fourth, more exasperating, was to follow. "Cornwallis, in further violation of the conditions of capitulation, sent many leading men of Charleston as close prisoners to St. Augustine;" while many others were confined in the prison ships Torbay and Packhorse in Charleston Harbor.

And, the crowning act of all this madness, was the embodiment all through the State, of bands of Tories under the authority of the above proclamations, by which the Whig inhabitants were worried, plundered and murdered in open violation of all the pledges given to the contrary. Drunken with the lust of power, the British conqueror acted as if the pledges given by him were of no force or obligation. Truly, by such course, was confirmed the maxim, "whom the gods wish to destroy, they first madden." For by the policy pursued, the patriotic inhabitants were bitterly taught to realize that no faith was to be placed in the assurances given, and that their liberties, self-respect, and property could be preserved only by the aid of the sword which they had invoked in the inception of the Revolution.

Very soon, little bands of patriots began to gather in various sections of the State, and to stand to their arms in defence of home, liberty, and their rights. Often defeated and scattered, they rallied and re-rallied, now striking here, and now there, always gaining in confidence, and slowly but surely drawing more and more of strength from among the harried citizens.

The affairs at Beckhamville, Mobley's Meeting House, Musgrove's Mills, Rocky Mount, Hanging Rock, Blackstocks, all showed that the proclamations, and the spread of the British army throughout the State to enforce these, had aroused a spirit of most determined resistance. "The British officers were perplexed." General Gates, with a Continental force, approached Camden, and Lord Cornwallis hastened from Charleston to the threatened point. At Rugeley's Mills, near Camden, General Gates suffered that disastrous defeat which again annihilated the American army which had been sent into South Carolina, and practically placed him upon the retired list during the remainder of the war. Pressing his victory, Earl Cornwallis "considered the subjugation of South Carolina complete, and confident of future success," advanced to Charlotte, North Carolina.

Unmindful of the wanton violation of faith on the part of the British, Lord Cornwallis saw fit to think the patriotic uprising acts of perfidy to be restrained "by examples of severity and the terrors of punishment. With this view, the estates of all who had left the province to join the enemies of Great Britain, or who were employed in the service, or held commissions under the authority of Congress, and also of all those who continued to oppose the re-establishment of his majesty's government within the province, were ordered to be sequestered * * and to impress them with an idea that this punishment (instant death to those who having taken protection were afterwards found in arms) would be hereafter rigorously inflicted. Some few of the most hardened of the militia who had been taken in General Gates's army with arms in their hands and protections in their pockets were actually executed." (Stedman.)

The prospects in South Carolina were gloomy in the extreme, but the militia brigadiers Marion, Sumter, and Pickens, of that State, with the gallant and hardy mountaineers of South Carolina, North Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, under Williams, Shelby, Cleaveland, Sevier, McDowell, Lacy, Hill, were rallying for the rescue. At King's Mountain, 8th October, 1780, these brave mountaineers, struck the blow which "completely crushed the spirit of the Loyalists and weakened beyond recovery the royal power in the Carolinas." Intelligence of the defeat of Ferguson destroyed all Cornwallis's hopes of Tory aid. He instantly left Charlotte, retrograded, and established his camp at Winnsboro, in Fairfield District."

Stedman, the British author, says: "The total loss of so considerable a detachment, from the operations of which so much was expected, put a stop, for the present, to the further progress of the commander-in-chief, and obliged him to fall back into South Carolina for the protection of its western borders against the incursions of a horde of mountaineers, whose appearance was as unexpected as their success was fatal to the prosecution of the intended expedition." And he also says: "But to whatever cause their disaffection was owing, it gave much trouble to Earl Cornwallis and greatly retarded his operations."

In October, 1780, General Nathaniel Greene, succeeded General Gates in the command of the Southern department, and began actively to reorganize the army so nearly annihilated at Rugeley's Mills. "His first arrangement was to divide his army into two detachments, the largest of which under himself, he stationed opposite Cheraw Hill, on the east side of the Pee Dee River, in Chesterfield District * * about 70 miles to the right of Cornwallis, who was then at Winnsboro. The other, composed of about 1,000 troops, under General Morgan, was placed some 50 miles to the left, near the junction of the Broad and Pacolet Rivers, in Union District. Cornwallis sent Colonel Tarleton, with a considerable force, to disperse the little army of Morgan, and soon the memorable battle of the Cowpens occurred, in which

the Americans were victorious. Tarleton, with the remnant of his troops, retreated precipitately to the main army of Cornwallis * * and Morgan, in the evening of the same day, crossed the Broad River and moved by forced marches towards the Catawba, to form a junction with the division of General Greene. When Cornwallis heard of the defeat of Tarleton and the direction that Morgan had taken, he resolved on pursuit, with the hopes of regaining the prisoners taken at the Cowpens, and demolishing the American army before they could reach the Catawba. He was joined on the 18th (January, 1781,) by General Leslie and his troops from Camden. To facilitate his march, he ordered all the superfluous baggage and wagons to be destroyed at Ramsour's Mills." Meanwhile, General Greene, who had joined Morgan, and saw the pursuit, sent orders to General Huger to march with the division at Cheraw Hill and form a junction with General Morgan's division at Salisbury or Charlotte, North Carolina. Now commenced that memorable strategic retreat which lured Lord Cornwallis from his base of operations and finally resulted, in connection with operations hereafter to be mentioned, in the capitulation at Yorktown.

Of the battle of Cowpens, Stedman says: "The defeat of his majesty's troops at the Cowpens formed a very principal link in the chain of circumstances which led to the independence of America." And speaking of Cornwallis's pursuit of Greene, he says: "Yet the operations of Lord Cornwallis, during the pursuit, would probably have been more efficacious had not the unfortunate affair at the Cowpens deprived him of almost the whole of his light troops."

In February, 1781, General Greene had crossed the Dan River and was in Virginia, and, according to Stedman, "Lord Cornwallis, having thus driven General Greene out of the province of North Carolina, returned by easy marches from the banks of the Dan to Hillsboro, where he erected the king's standard, and invited by proclamation all loyal subjects to repair to it and take an active part in assisting him to restore order and constitutional government. * *

Considerable numbers were preparing to assemble, when General Greene, alarmed with the intelligence of their motions, and the presumed effect of Lord Cornwallis's proclamation, and being about the same time reinforced with 600 Virginia militia, under General Stevens, took the resolution of again crossing the Dan, and re-entering North Carolina." Lossing says: "Although driven across the Dan, Greene had no idea of abandoning North Carolina to the quiet possession of the enemy."

This recrossing of the Dan by General Greene was followed by the battle of Guilford Court House, on the 15th of March, 1781, and the retreat of the American army. Of this battle, Stedman says: "In this battle the British troops obtained a victory most honorable and glorious to themselves, but in its consequences of no real advantage to the cause in which they were engaged. * * * Had Lord Cornwallis had with him at the action at Guilford Court House those troops that were lost by Colonel Tarleton at the Cowpens, on 15th March, 1781, it is not extravagant to suppose that the American colonies might have been reunited to the empire of Great Britain."

The consequence of the action at Guilford was the retreat of Cornwallis to Wilmington, North Carolina, to which place "previously to the departure of the army from Winnsboro. Lieutenant Colonel Balfour, who commanded at Charleston, had been directed to send round by water a competent force to take possession * * and occupy it as a post with which Lord Cornwallis, in his progress to the northward, might open a communication for the purpose of obtaining supplies." During this retreat General Greene hung upon and harrassed the rear of the retreating British army.

"Lord Cornwallis being under the necessity of repairing to a seaport town to obtain necessary supplies, particularly shoes and clothing for the army, was apprehensive lest General Greene should return to South Carolina. Accordingly several messengers were dispatched to Lord Rawdon at Camden to prepare him for such an event. * * * Not long

after the arrival of Lord Cornwallis at Wilmington he received information that what he apprehended as probable had actually taken place; and that General Greene, upon his return to the upper country, had taken the direct road to Camden, and was marching with the utmost expedition to attack Lord Rawdon. This intelligence rendered the situation of the British commander more embarrassing than ever and left him only a choice of difficulties, none of which were unaccompanied with hazard nor easy to be surmounted. It was undoubtedly his wish to afford succor to Lord Rawdon, but he knew that it was impossible for him, after the progress already made by General Greene, to arrive in time. The fate of Lord Rawdon and his garrison must be determined long before the British army could reach Camden; and, should General Greene be successful, there was danger that he might have it in his power to hem up his Lordship while on his march between the great rivers, and, by cutting off his subsistence, render his army useless. On the other hand, if General Greene should be defeated, the return of the British army would be less necessary. A measure pregnant with so much danger in the execution and promising so little advantage in the result was not to be hastily adopted. Yet something was necessary to be done. The effective force of his Lordship, from sickness, desertion, and the loss sustained at Guilford Court House, was now reduced to 1,435 men. * * To remain where he was would be not only useless, but * * endanger the health of the troops. To return to South Carolina by land would be accompanied with the hazards already mentioned; and to return by water would be not only disgraceful, but take up much time in waiting for transports: * * his Lordship determined to take advantage of General Greene's absence from North Carolina, to march through that province into Virginia, and join his force to a strong corps that had been acting there from the beginning of the year, first under Brigadier General Arnold, and afterwards under Major General Philips, in order to make a diversion in favor of the British operations in North Carolina. This movement, it was thought, might

have a tendency to draw General Greene back to the northward, and seems to have been more readily adopted, as it was the opinion of Earl Cornwallis that vigorous measures pursued in Virginia and the reduction of that province, if practicable, would be the most effectual means of securing those possessions that had been already recovered in the Southern provinces, and of subjecting such as remained to be subjected. Earl Cornwallis began his march from Wilmington on 25th April. * * Thus we find that the victory at Guilford drew after it some, and it will afterwards appear that it was followed by all the consequences of something nearly allied to a decisive defeat."

It is not necessary, in this connection, to follow General Greene and his army on the march to South Carolina. The results are well known: the State was freed from the tread of the enemy by the evacuation of Charleston on 14th December, 1782. Of the toils by which this was brought about, let General Greene tell in the few following words:

"For upwards of two months, more than one-third of our army was naked, with nothing but a breech cloth about them, and never came out of their tents, and the rest were ragged as wolves. Our condition was little better in the article of provisions; our beef was perfect carrion, and even bad as it was, we were frequently without any. An army thus clothed and thus fed may be considered in a desperate situation."

It is not wonderful, when learning these conditions, that Stedman should close his History of the American War with eulogiums on the American soldiery, and, among other things say: "The Americans had neither money nor credit; but they learned to stand in need only of a few things; to be contented with the small allowance that nature requires; to suffer as well as to act. Their councils, animated by liberty, under the most distressing circumstances, took a grand and high spirited course, and they were finally triumphant."

It has previously been sketched how the plan of campaign for the reduction of the rebellious colonies had been transferred from the Northern to the Southern States; it has been told that when Sir Henry Clinton, believing that he had

subjugated South Carolina, returned to New York, leaving Lieutenant General Cornwallis in command, "with the charge of prosecuting the war in North Carolina as soon as the season of the year and other circumstances would permit." In pursuance of the general plan of the campaign, Stedman tells that—"After it had been determined to carry the war into the Southern colonies, first a detachment, as has been already mentioned, under General Leslie, and another afterwards under General Arnold, amounting to about 1,600, were sent by the commander-in-chief from New York into Virginia, for the double purpose of destroying the enemy's stores, and of assisting, by means of a diversion, the operations of Lord Cornwallis in the two Carolinas."

Of the detachment under General Leslie, Lossing says: "Brigadier General Leslie, with about 3,000 troops from New York, landed at Portsmouth (October, 1780,) and took possession of every kind of public property there and in the vicinity. Leslie was to co-operate with Cornwallis, who proposed to enter Virginia from the south. He did not remain long, for Cornwallis, hearing of the defeat of Ferguson at King's Mountain, hastily retreated; and Leslie, on being advised of this, left for Charleston, for the purpose of joining the Earl in the Carolinas."

The armies under Cornwallis and Arnold made a junction at Petersburg, Virginia, on 20th May, 1781, and Cornwallis assumed the general command. He proposed first to strike a blow at the American army under LaFayette; next, upon his defeat, to destroy such stores as could be reached, and "lastly, after proceeding to the execution of these objects, which probably might be accomplished by the time he could hear from New York, to keep himself disengaged from any operation that could interfere with the plan that might be devised by the commander-in-chief for the further prosecution of the campaign." The destruction of stores was accomplished, but from intercepted letters, Sir Henry Clinton feared that an attack was about to be made on New York by a combined American and French force. "In consequence of the information gathered from these letters, the commander-in-chief

made a requisition of part of the troops under Lord Cornwallis command in Virginia, and directed that they should be sent to New York without delay, unless his Lordship should at the time be engaged in some important movement that might render it necessary to detain them some time longer; or unless he should be disposed to execute the plan which the commander-in-chief seems to have had much at heart, of carrying the war to the upper part of the Chesapeake, and upon the Susquehannah, where a number of loyalists had associated for their mutual defence, and were said to be ready to act whenever the king's troops should appear among them.

It is not necessary to go into details here: suffice it to say, that Cornwallis prepared to send the troops, and believing that his weakened army made it necessary to find a stronger defensive position, he crossed into the Peninsula between the York and James rivers. Before the detached troops could sail, a countermanding order reached him, with instructions to select some defensive position on the waters of the Chesapeake, and the Commander-in-Chief "declared that, as soon as the season for acting in that country returned, he would probably send there all the troops he could spare from the different posts under his command." Acting under these orders, Cornwallis, after examining different positions, selected Yorktown, and on 22d August, 1781, concentrated his whole force there. On 28th September, 1781, the combined American and French armies sat down before Yorktown, and commenced that siege, which terminated on 19th October, by the capitulation of Lord Cornwallis, with the army, ships, stores, &c., under his command. This virtually terminated the war of the Revolution.

One of the articles inserted by the British commander at the capitulation of Charleston, required the drums not to beat a British march, or the colors to be uneased; this disposition of colors was considered degrading, and had been purposely inserted as an humiliation and insult. At the capitulation at Yorktown, as a reprisal, a like article was inserted, the drums not to beat an American or French march, or the colors to be uneased. Upon the marching

out of the British army, Cornwallis, feigning illness, sent the troops under the command of Gen. O'Hara, to whom he also gave his sword to be surrendered. Advancing to Gen. Washington to surrender the sword of Cornwallis, and apologize for his absence, Gen. O'Hara was directed to Gen. Lincoln, and to him the sword was surrendered, and by him immediately returned. The mortifications and humiliations of the surrender of Charleston were obliterated in the triumph of the surrender at Yorktown. The event, which, in the haughty pride of apparent success, the British commander, troops, people, and government, had hailed as the beginning of the end of the rebellion; which led the conqueror to violate every pledged faith to the conquered, under the conviction that the fire of revolution had been effectually stamped out, and the conquered could be dealt with at his conqueror's sole will and pleasure: that event was but the first step to the ultimate humiliation of the British commanders, troops, people, and government. Earl Cornwallis was a conspicuous figure on the first, and doubtless revelled high with triumph. In the causes which brought about the general uprising of the people of South Carolina, and through such uprising brought about results which carried him beyond its borders, and to his surrender, Earl Cornwallis was the chief actor. In this last scene of the drama, he again appears a prominent figure, but "feigning illness" to avoid the personal mortification which, if a truly courageous man, he should have felt it a duty and pride to share in common with the brave men who had done all in their ability to avert. Of Earl Cornwallis, Lossing says: "He was the most competent and energetic of all the British Generals sent here during the war, but the cruelties exercised by his orders at times, during the Southern campaigns, have left an indelible stain upon his character." And again: "The conduct of Lord Cornwallis during his march of over fifteen hundred miles through the Southern States was often disgraceful to the British name. He suffered dwelling houses to be plundered of every thing that could be carried off; and it was well known that his Lordship's table was fur-

nished with plate thus obtained from private families. * * * It was also estimated at the time, from the best information that could be obtained, that, during the six months previous to the surrender at Yorktown, the whole devastations of his army amounted to about \$15,000,000." After the butchery of Buford's command by Tarleton, Lord Cornwallis writes to Sir Henry Clinton: "I can only add the highest encomiums on the conduct of Lieut.-Col. Tarleton. It will give me the most sensible satisfaction to hear that your Excellency has been able to obtain for him some distinguished mark of his Majesty's favor." After the surprise of Sumter, at Fishing Creek, and the massacre of so large a part of his command, Lord Cornwallis writes to Sir Henry Clinton: "This action was too brilliant to need any comment of mine, and will, I have no doubt, highly recommend Lieut.-Col. Tarleton to his Majesty's favor." At the capitulation of Charleston, Gen. Richard Richardson was taken a prisoner and paroled. After the proclamations, Lord Cornwallis "proposed to him, in the presence of his family, either to unite himself to the royal standard, with a carte blanche as to offices, titles and other gifts of the Crown, or that he must submit to the alternative of close confinement." The offer of office was promptly rejected. "The alternative threatened was promptly and rigidly enforced; his health declined under the joint influence of a sickly climate and a loathsome prison house; the infirmities of old age (then in his 76th year) increased rapidly upon him, and death was so evidently approaching, that he was again sent home in September, to linger out the last remaining hours of his life at his family residence. His remains had been interred but a short time before Tarleton occupied the establishment. He ordered the body of Gen. Richardson to be taken up, and left it exposed, until, by the entreaties of his family, they were permitted to re-inter it." And, later on, Tarleton again visited this establishment, and "after having feasted all his command, he ordered the destruction of all the buildings, and other property on the place, reluctantly permitting the widow and orphans to save their clothing and a very few

necessaries." Tarleton's quarters had become a synonym for all that was cruel. These doings were deliberate parts of the campaign, and but repetitions of what was done during Prevost's invasion. Botta says of Prevost's invasion : "The royal troops were not satisfied with pillaging ; they spared neither women, nor children, nor sick. * * Such was the rapacity of these robbers, that, not content with stripping houses of their richest furniture and individuals of their most precious ornaments, they violated even the sanctuary of the dead, and, grasping for gold, went rummaging among the tombs. * * Vain would be the attempts to paint the brutal fury of this lawless soldiery. * * A cry of horror arose throughout the civilized world against the ferocity of the British armies." It is not then surprising to learn from Col. Lee's Memoirs, that " previous to the surrender, Tarleton waited upon General Choise and communicated to that officer his apprehensions for his personal safety, if put at the disposal of the American militia. This conference was sought for the purpose of inducing an arrangement which should shield him from the vengeance of the inhabitants. General Choise did not hesitate a moment in gratifying the wishes of Tarleton. * * * It would have been very satisfactory to have been enabled to give the reasons which induced this communication from Lieut.-Col. Tarleton, but Choise did not go into the inquiry, and they remain unascertained."

As Earl Cornwallis and his trusted Lieut.-Col. Tarleton remained in their quarters on that memorable 19th October, 1781, the one "feigning illness," to avoid personal mortification, the other quailing under "his apprehensions for his personal safety," * * and praying for "an arrangement which should shield him from the vengeance of its inhabitants," and their eyes saw the British colors uncased, being marched out for surrender; and their ears were saluted with the British march, "The world turned upside down," doubtless their thoughts reverted to that other surrender, when the American colors, uncased, were being marched to surrender, and the American drums beat the Turk's march.

Doubtless they contrasted the high anticipations of a speedy suppression of the rebellion, with which the capitulation at Charleston had filled their hearts, with the certainty that in this their humiliation and defeat, American independence was achieved ; and realized that what in their pride and haughtiness they called rebellion, was become a successful revolution, the birth of a new government and people, the equals and peer among the nations of the earth, of their own government and people. It does not require any effort of the imagination to suppose that gory images arose before each of them, in which, among others, the face of the murdered and disinterred aged patriot, Gen. Richard Richardson stood, reproaching the commander with his violated pledges of faith, and the Lieutenant with his fiendish brutality : the pale faces of helpless women and innocent children, robbed of even the necessities of life, and rendered homeless by their residences burned over their heads, may have stood before them, crying shame upon their manhood, and inhumanity. In the battle-scarred faces which were then surrounding them, and receiving their submission, they must bitterly have realized that they had sown the wind and were reaping the whirlwind.

On those plains before Yorktown I do not know of a single soldier from South Carolina, except Lieutenant Colonel John Laurens, who, with Colonel Alexander Hamilton, on the night of 11th October, 1781, led the American detachment which stormed redoubt K. The capitulation at Charleston had annihilated the Continental line of that State, and such State enlisted troops and militia as she then had in the field were daily engaged in driving the British from their garrisoned posts throughout the State into the shelter of their lines at Charleston. There would, therefore, seem nothing especially to connect South Carolina with the surrender at Yorktown. But the campaign of 1780 and the early part of 1781 had much, very much to do with it. The British plan of campaign had contemplated the reduction of Charleston ; the overrunning and subjugation of the State ; an advance into North Carolina, and the union with Loyalist forces to

be raised in the old Highlander settlement; a march with the reinforced army into Virginia and an union there with the army sent from New York to make a diversion in favor of Earl Cornwallis's operations in North Carolina and South Carolina; the overriding of Virginia with this united army, and then the hemming in of General Washington and the American army between the army of Cornwallis on the one side and the army of Sir Henry Clinton on the other.

But the unexpected, stubborn resistance in South Carolina had defeated and set at naught the first march in the proposed campaign. During the whole of 1780 Cornwallis was kept too busy in South Carolina to carry on the advance into North Carolina, and when, in the early part of 1781, he did so advance, it was by his being lured on by Greene, drawing him away from his base, and finally leaving him so sore perplexed whither to turn, that in his perplexity he took the road to his destruction. The increasing pressure upon the British troops remaining in South Carolina forbade any help to the perplexed Earl from that source, and he was unable to return by the way he had gone.

The South Carolina State troops and militia bore very important parts in the recovery of that State, so that while not a soldier of hers was in the trenches at Yorktown, yet looking upon the campaign in the Southern States as a whole plan, looking at the causes which deranged that campaign and which forced the British commander of that campaign from an aggressive to a defensive position, it is not improper to say that indirectly, but very importantly, South Carolina contributed largely to the surrender at Yorktown.

To us as Americans, and particularly as descendants from officers of the American army, the surrender at Yorktown is memorable; a day to be commemorated as one of the most eventful in the war of the Revolution; and as such, we of the State Society of the Cincinnati of South Carolina make it one of the days for our stated meetings; this we do as Americans and as descendants from Revolutionary officers of the American army. But, by the remarks which I have



made to you, I wish you, my fellow-members of the Society, to appreciate that the events in South Carolina, the stubborn resistance of her people, with the persistent skill evinced by General Greene in conducting the campaign in her borders, did materially contribute to the surrender at Yorktown, and identifies the South Carolinians in the triumphs and advantages which flowed from it.

I propose to you the regular standing toast: "The 19th October, 1780—the surrender at Yorktown."